Wednesday, 18 April 2012

Three Philosophical Conceptions of Causality

Socratic Law of Causality
Everything that happens, happens for a reason; that is, it is a fact that can be accounted for (Theaetetus, 201d).

Galilean Law of Causality
Everything that happens, happens because it is caused physically to happen.

Nietzschean Law of Causality
Everything that happens can be traced back to a 'discourse'; - although this is not a word Nietzsche used (neither Habermas's Diskurs nor Heidegger's Rede). This discourse arises in the will to power.

Both Socrates' 'accounts' and Galileo's concept of physical cause (Will to Power: 551) are manifestations of a discourse of will to power in which penetrating understanding and the instrumentalisation of the world are aspects of the fundamental principle of individuation and its desire for self-actualisation that ‘determines’ in a sense the basis of its functioning.

In being filtered through the individual’s will to power, causes and effects are matched on the basis of an epistemological schema chosen on the basis of prior demands. Ockham’s razor was one such schema, as was Einstein’s dictum that an explanation should be as simple as possible and no simpler. Schema themselves come from the will to power. Some scholars have suggested not unreasonably that the will to power can be traced back to evolutionary or biological demands (e.g., Peter Poellner), although Nietzsche himself cautioned against biological literalism (it's an interpretative schema, remember?) and proferred the metaphor instead.

Why did he fear going beyond the metaphor? There are two reasons; firstly, because he was a realist in observing the constant revisability of the sciences; secondly, because that way idols lie littering the landscape like a thousand Ozymandiases, and there can be only one poem as good as Shelley's by which to remember them. Nietzsche preached what he preached, even if his practice came up short.

But this is the difficulty of rational life – establishing laws and choosing criteria for values.

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